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Andrea Passeri, Research 
Fellow and Adjunct 
Professor at the 
Department of PoliƟcal 
and Social Sciences, 
University of Bologna, 
explains that “Taiwan‐
Myanmar relaƟons are 
expected to flourish aŌer 
decades of substanƟal 
neglect.“ 
Since the early 1990s, a vast biparƟsan consensus among Taiwanese policymakers has looked at 
Southeast Asia as a credible countercheck to China’s growing leverage over the island. As a result, 
the idea of a ‘go south’ policy aimed at strengthening Taipei’s economic and poliƟcal standing 
with ASEAN countries has made headlines both during the Lee Teng‐hui and Chen Shui‐bian 
presidencies, before being rebranded by the current Tsai Ing‐wen government under the banner 
of the ‘New Southbound Policy’ (NSP) in 2016. In a nutshell, the strategy seeks to reinvigorate 
Taiwan’s links with its southern neighbors, whilst safeguarding both the special relaƟonship with 
the United States and its extensive economic Ɵes with the Chinese mainland. Taiwan‐Myanmar 
relaƟons have to be seen against this wider and deeper backdrop, 
Taiwan’s push toward the enlargement and diversificaƟon of its informal partnerships away from 
the PRC stems from two sets of factors. First, Beijing’s ongoing economic slowdown, which has 
already impacted Taiwan’s growth prospects, requires diversified opƟons for Taipei. Second, 
China’s rising tendency to weaponize commercial and financial tools as a form of poliƟcal 
retaliaƟon against selected countries also makes Taiwan nervous. Accordingly, the NSP foresees a 
visible rebalancing of Taipei’s diplomaƟc landscape by focusing its aƩenƟon on three geopoliƟcal 
perimeters, namely the Indian subconƟnent, Southeast Asia, and Oceania, so as to pave the way 
for expanded commercial exchanges, cooperaƟon projects, and people‐to‐people contacts. 
Taiwan‐Myanmar relaƟons are thus expected to flourish aŌer decades of substanƟal neglect, 
largely moƟvated by a quite divisive historical legacy that hampered the consolidaƟon of regular 
(albeit unofficial) interacƟons amongst the two sides. Most notably, the contenƟous memories of 
the Kuomintang’s (KMT) entrenchment in northern Myanmar during the early 1950s – when the 
KMT’s ‘jungle generals’ established their safe havens in Burmese border regions inhabited by 
Chinese minoriƟes by engaging in the highly lucraƟve opium trade – are sƟll extremely vivid in the 
minds of the Myanmar populaƟon and poliƟcal establishment, due also to the fact that the central 
government has never fully consolidated its control over the country’s peripheral areas.  
Unsurprisingly, Myanmar (then known as Burma) emerged as the first non‐socialist state in Asia to 
pick sides in the ensuing dispute over the status of Taiwan, following the establishment of formal 
diplomaƟc Ɵes with the PRC in 1950 and the launch of several large‐scale military operaƟons to 
dislodge the remnants of the KMT from its fronƟer areas. On top of that, Taiwan’s decision to 
pursue a staunch anƟ‐communist diplomacy in the midst of the Cold War further impaired the 
prospects of dialogue with Yangon, especially in the aŌermath of the 1962 military 
coup d'état that introduced a brand‐new ideology rooted in the ‘Burmese way to socialism’. At the 
turn of the century, as bilateral interacƟons languished in this hiatus, Taiwan’s economic footprint 
inside Myanmar looked totally eclipsed by the mounƟng influence of the PRC, which had 
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progressively asserted itself as the main diplomaƟc patron and lender of last resort of the 
Burmese military regime. 
However, Myanmar’s recent opening up to the outside world aŌer decades of isolaƟonist 
and inward‐looking policies has allowed a posiƟve impact on its previously strained relaƟons 
with Taipei. During 2016, the unveiling of Tsai Ing‐wen’s NSP has therefore persuaded the 
freshly‐established cabinet led by the progressives to open the Taipei Economic and Cultural 
Office (TECO) in Myanmar, which is expected to act as an informal embassy through the 
promoƟon of fruiƞul exchanges between the two actors in trade and investment, two‐way 
tourism, and cultural cooperaƟon. At the end of 2018, bilateral trade volume has reached 
$343 million — a five‐fold increase over the course of the previous three years — whereas 
Taiwan’s investments in the country have lately peaked to $356 million, with around 250 
Taiwanese enterprises and 11 banks that are making inroads in Myanmar’s largely untapped 
market. People‐to‐people exchanges are also facilitaƟng a promising trend, fueled by a 
significant diaspora of Burmese immigrants located in Taiwan. By the same token, student 
exchanges and cooperaƟon projects in the field of higher educaƟon have recently hit several 
important milestones, also benefiƫng from the relaxaƟon of Taiwanese visa restricƟons for 
Burmese travelers, even though the road ahead in the aƩempt to compete with Myanmar’s 
preferenƟal partners is sƟll long and fraught with obstacles.  
In terms of FDI, for instance, the achievements brought about by the NSP are totally 
overshadowed by the performances of countries like Singapore and the PRC, whose 
cumulaƟve investments into Myanmar currently stand at $21 billion and $20 billion, 
respecƟvely. In addiƟon, in the case of Myanmar, the third iteraƟon of the NSP endorsed by 
Tsai Ing‐wen has displayed an extremely low profile when confronted by major poliƟcal 
issues, such as the Rohingya conundrum or the establishment of a lasƟng ceasefire 
agreement between the central government in Naypyidaw and a plethora of ethnic 
minoriƟes. As a result, the choice of maintaining a silent stance over these maƩers has 
gradually disappointed those who look at Taipei as a cradle of democracy and human rights, 
both inside the country and in regional audiences. Informed by a clear emphasis on 
economics and concerned by the risks of upseƫng the Burmese government, the Tsai 
AdministraƟon has refrained from engaging the communiƟes and civil society organizaƟons 
affected by the Rohingya crisis through the mulƟlayered and people‐centered approach 
delineated in the NSP. In the meanƟme, China’s unwavering support to Myanmar in 
rebuffing internaƟonal scruƟny over the Rakhine State issue is raising its credenƟals as the 
paramount interlocutor of the current cabinet led by Aung San Suu Kyi. Given such 
circumstances, if the NSP ulƟmately reflects Taiwan’s quest to rekindle its role and idenƟty 
in the region beyond economic returns, it is Ɵme to fill this silence with a more courageous 
voice.  
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